For the Benefit of Mali- or the Glory of France? by James W Monroe

Unnoticed by many, the civil war in Mali has raged for the last few years between nationalist Tauregs and Islamic militant supporters against the democratic government. The rebels upped the ante since 2007 when they took over the north, helped by unrest and weapons from surrounding nations.

At the recent crisis point (at time of writing 16 January 2013) when the city of Konna was captured, the French launched a very bold, aggressive and assertive ground war. Despite having international diplomatic support (unlike some previous Western military ventures), this action is independent of a UN decision or a NATO task force. Although there are other African armies arriving to assist in the fighting, to all extents and purposes the French are going it alone in Mali. This is a marked contrast to previous military campaigns; hopefully a rapid unilateral action will be more effective than past joint operations.

The Al Qaeda subsidiary group Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has spread to North Africa and has benefited and thrived from lawlessness and uprisings in the last several years in that region, as have other similar groups such as the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), itself an offshoot of another Al Qaeda group (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM). It is well known, for example, that AQAP is supporting or involved in piracy in the Indian Ocean and surrounding, and assists and backs many Somali pirates. Such piracy costs the global economy between US $7 billion to US $12 billion annually. It is undoubtedly vital for African and global security that AQAP be confronted and tackled. A spread of AQAP to North Africa, on the shores of the Mediterranean and the EU, needs to be avoided at all costs. This bold move to deploy the French Army to Mali sends a clear message, and is a demonstration of the muscular stance of the Elysee Palace against terrorism, and its determination to tackle terrorism and related matters. It must be noted that this deployment is not purely humanitarian or counter terrorism- but also protectionist. France has a long colonial history in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, etc) and indeed to this day has long standing political, cultural and economic interests in the region (e.g. Tunisia). Action in Mali, whilst helpful for the people of Mali, also greats helps to protect French interests and concerns along the North African coast.

Despite the influx of French troops, the future arrival of African soldiers, and the military infrastructure and supplies sent into Mali to support these armed operations, what is set out to be a swift armed response to a local crisis could easily see the French Army and its African allies locked into a vicious civil war for a long time, as battlegrounds and loyalties shift. This would have negative long term outcomes for all participants- and above all innocent civilians. Is France prepared for a long endgame in Mali, and to remain behind after the fighting is done to provide rebuilding, education and similar? Indeed, from an initial deployment of 550 troops, now the numbers of French soldiers present is increasing to 2,500- and more international help, such as RAF transport planes, is en route. It is to be hoped that the Elysee Palace will learn from Iraq & Afghanistan, and be prepared for the long haul in this military operation, and to support an armed response with diplomatic and humanitarian endeavours. Armed force alone will not help the situation in Mali; over time, economic boosts, improving infrastructure, more resources, education, restructuring, rebuilding and similar will all have vital roles to play in rebuilding Mali after this conflict is over. The French government has to ask itself whether it is prepared to go that distance to get an effective and lasting remedy to the strife in Mali.

Although such a response to an undoubted humanitarian crisis and such a bold stance against AQAP and affiliates is only to be commended, the motivations of the French leadership are unlikely to be wholly altruistic.  The Hollande presidency has some under a lot of criticism recently, what with tax hikes on businesses and the super-rich, French economic migration to Belgium and neighbouring countries (including iconic Frenchman Gérard Depardieu becoming a Russian citizen in protest), and the furore over gay marriage only this week. History shows that nothing stirs up public support than armed conflict abroad. Could Hollande be deploying troops to deflect public opinion and gossip away from his domestic troubles? 

James W Monroe
Law Student

BPP University College